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Raymond Harbridge * 
• 
• ID 
Prevailing folklore in New Zealand has it that wage bargaining outcomes are 
unduly inflexible. lntplicit contract theory .~uggests that while wages may be sticky 
and somewhat rigid within a single wage round, stzckiness will diminish over time 
as wages become responsive to outside economic forces. This paper examines the 
hypothesis that the stickiness of wage settlements diminishes over time and 
develops 4 criteria for testing that hypothesis. Data for all settlements regi.qtered 
with the Arbitration Commission since 1984 are used. Analysis of the data 
indicates that despite folklore to the contrary, a very important degree of wage 
flexibility exist$. 
1. Introduction 
The question of whether wage flexibility exists in New Zealand's collective 
bargaining system has been the subject of considerable speculation, claim and counter-
claim in policy debates about whether further de-regulation of the New Zealand labour 
market is required (Dannin? 1990). Some of the proponents of further flexibility have 
relied heavily on folklore rather Lhan facts, and in the quite recent past some of the 
"statistics" quoted have been badly astray. The OECD recently made the claim that in the 
1987-88 wage round "90 percent of subsequent wage seu.lements were clustered around 1 
percentage point of the 7 percent metal trades award" (OECD, 1989). A senior employer 
negotiator, Tom Kiely, had earlier made an identical claim (Kiely, 1988). In fact, 67 
percent of all settlements lay within the one percent either way figure, and 69 percent of 
awards fell in the same range in that particular wage round (Harbridgc and McCaw, 
1990a). An industrial mediator (GrilJs, 1988) made a similar claim for the same wage 
round staling that "two out of three sculemenLS were reached between 7 and 8 percent'' 
when in fact 2 out of 3 settlements were reached between 6 and 8 percent (Harbridge and 
McCaw, 1990a). Other examples abound, but the overall impression given is that wage 
settlements confonn to a very rigid pattern. 
The need for an accurate statement of fact regarding wage flexibility is lhereforc 
apparent, as is the need for the developrnent of criteria for evaluating the extent of wage 
dispersion. Any framework for exarnining wage flexibility needs to take a number of 
institutional and legal factors into account. Schultze (1985) explains the notion of the 
tlstickincss'' of wages in terms of implied contract theory. Workers are not like other 
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economic agents, in that they acquire non-transferable employer-specific skills and the 
cost of acquiring those skills may have been borne by the employer; workers acquire 
experience on the job; and additional search, transition and moving costs are incurred by 
the employer when a worker leaves. In these circumstances, wages are fixed, in part, by a 
"looking over the shoulder" approach. In the absence of precise information about 
relevant economic factors, and because the employer does not want to lose a committed, 
trained workforce, the employer and union parties to negotiations tend to look at what 
others have agreed in their bargaining - this being the "implicit contract". Accordingly, 
under this thoory, wage fixing outcomes would not be expected to be particularly flexible 
in the short tenn. Flexibility may however be expected over time as the labour market 
adjusts to external pressures. 
In the New Zealand context, Easton ( 1987) has developed Schultze's views that 
implicit contract theory suggests an inherent stickiness in wage relativities. Institutional 
wage setting features are reviewed, particularly as they relate to downwards flexibility. 
Minimum wages are established either under the Minimum Wage Act 1945 or in awards 
and collective agreements negotiated under the Labour Relations Act 1987. There are 
some serious constraints on downwards flexibility, particularly within the award 
bargaining system. First, awards already contain comparatively low wage rates. For 
example, in the 1988/89 wage round, 30 percent of all awards contained a minimum adult 
rate of $280 or less per week and 50 percent contained a minimum adult rate a rate of pay 
of $295 or less per week. Second, there is a genuine constraint at the zero increase level -
if employers claim a lower wage settlement than that currently applying in the existing 
settlement, then unions would refuse to reach settlement. In that event, the existing 
award would run its course as provided for under the Labour Relations Act and wages 
would continue at their current levels. Third, the lower bounds of flexibility are 
constrained by the fixture of the minimum wage as set from time to time under the 
Minimum Wage Act. The Minimum Wage Act plays an important role in maintaining 
minimum award rates. For example, in the 1988/89 wage round there were 13 awards 
registered that contamed an adult rate of pay lower than the then minimum wage of $235 
per week. More recently, when the Government adjusted the minimum wage to $245 per 
week as from 17 September 1990, there were 31 awards already registered as part of the 
1989-90 wage round which contained an adult rate of pay lower than the new minimum 
wage. The wage rate set under the Minimum Wage Act takes precedence over any rate set 
in an award and the Arbitration Commission indicates to union and employer parties any 
pay rates 1n proposed awards and collective agreements that would breach the Act's 
. prOVISiOnS. 
In addition, if inflation is comparatively low - say at 4 percent per annum - then the 
degree of possible wage dispersion is limited (for the sorts of reasons just outlined) to 
tncreases from a zero percent increase at the lower end of the scale to increases around or 
slightly more than 4 percent. If however, inflation is comparatively high - say 1 5 
percent - then the degree of dispersion still is bounded at the lower end of the scale by a 
zero percent increase, but the range of settlements is likely to extend up to and above 15 
percent. Clearly a far wider range of dispersion is available in times of high inflation. 
Inflation is most frequently measured by the consumers price index (CPI) and the 
producers' pnce index (PPI). CPI IS limited as a comparator to wage increments as other 
income related factors are involved. A more useful measure of inflation is PPI (inputs). 
PPI is a better comparator for wage increases than CPI, as it measures the cost increases 
of goods and scrvtce5, other than wage costs, to producers (Department of Statistics, 
1990). Further, PPI IS useful for it ts calculated on an ex-GST basis, thus providing a 
statistic that can be compared with wage movements which were not themselves intended 
to incorporate GST (Dickson, 1989). It is worth observing that the use of CPI and PPI 
to de nate wages reflect two different perceptions of the role of wages. Easton ( 1986, 
p.31) descnbcs these different perceptions as "wages-as-income" and "wages-as-costs". 
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Wells and Bertram (1983, p.72) make a similar distinction, using the terms "real-income-
wage" and "real-product-wage". 
2. Terminology and methodology 
The wage data presented in this paper commence with all settlements registered with 
the Arbitration Commission after I December 1984- the end of a government imposed 
wage freeze. The data presented are grouped within the 5 consecutive wage rounds from 
1984/85 to 1988/89. While documents arc negotiated and settled at different points 
through each wage round, there remains a clear pattern of documents being negotiated in 
the September to September year, with a majority of settlements containing wage 
increments applicable from at least the month of February. 
The data presented do not represent all settlements negotiated and registered with the 
Arbitration Commission for each wage round. This is because the data measure change 
from one wage round to another. This means, for example, that settlements that are new 
and that have been registered with the Commission for the fust time are excluded from 
consideration. Also excluded are settlements that have been renegotiated long after their 
nominal expiry. The other main category of exclusion of wage settlements are those that 
were for flat monetary increases rather than percentage increments. These settlements 
were excluded as the conversion of a flat monetary increase to a percentage increase 
produces a range of percentage increases rather than a single score, and the incorporation 
of ranges of percentage increments into the dataset was not possible. 
That the data are measuring change from one wage round to another is important for 
it introduces significant biases in the level of flexibility observed. Important levels of 
change in the tails of the distribution of the settlements are not being recorded in the data 
presented in this paper. It has been informally observed by the author that the new 
settlements represent wage levels and increments generally well above the pattern of 
settlements for any particular wage round. Accordingly the exclusion of a large number 
of new settlements is almost certainly excluding settlements that represent upwards 
flexibility, found in the high tail of the distribution of settlements, being wage 
increments well above the mean wage settlement. In the low t~l of the distribution, the 
data does not record those documents that have not been renegotiated from one round to 
the next and that are, in some cases, on the way to lapsing altogether. In considering the 
outcomes of the 1988/89 wage round, it is argued elsewhere that some of the award 
negotiations that did not lead to a settlement were more important in any overall view of 
structural bargaining changes than were those negotiations that did lead to a registered 
settlement (Harbridge and McCaw 1990b). In the 1988/89 wage round, there were 25 
awards that were not renegotiated from either of the previous two wage rounds even 
though the unions concerned had attempted to do so. This represents nearly 10 percent of 
all awards registered in the 1988/89 wage round. Employer intransigence was given as the 
reason for non-settlements by the unions involved. 
Five statistics which aid interpretation of the degree of clispersion within wage rounds 
have been selected - ftrst the mean wage increase, second the standard deviaJion, third the 
semi interquartile range, fourth the "Bradford" statistic, and fifth skewness. Each of these 
variables requires some explanation. In the following tables the number of settlements, 
N, represents the number of settlements where the wage comparison between wage rounds 
was possible. Necessarily, N represents less than the total seUlements within the wage 
round but contains an important number of settlements. In the 5 wage rounds examined, 
N represents between 80 and 90 percent of all registered awards and between 65 and 75 
percent of all other types of registered settlements (voluntary collective agreements, 
composite agreements, agreements and composite awards). \ 
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The mean wage increase is the mean of the annualised wage increment calculated for 
each settlement. Our method of calculating the annualised wage increment takes into 
account a number of factors - whether the settlement was fully backdated to the expiry of 
the predecessor settlement; the term of the settlement if the term was for other than 12 
months; and whether the settlement was stepped i.e. increased more than once during the 
life of the settlement. A discussion of the theoretical and mathematical issues involved is 
available in Ansell, Brosnan and Harbridge (1990). The standard deviation presented is an 
important measure of dispersion around that mean. Taking the mean and the standard 
deviation together, the wage data can be described in terms of the mean wage settlement 
and in terms of the average variation from that mean within each wage round. 
The semi-interquartile range is the range in which the middle 50 percent of 
settlements fall. It is a useful measure of dispersion in that it excludes the difficulties of 
comparison that occur when the tail of the distribution is extreme - in one wage round for 
example, the mean wage increment was around 7.5 percent but there was a spread of 
settlements ranging from 0 percent to 22.5 percent. In any averaging process these 
extremes can distort the value of the mean in an unrepresentative way (Van Dalen, 1 962, 
p.341 ). 
The "Bradford" statistic is the percentage of settlements that fall within one percent 
either way of the percentage increment agreed in the Metal Trades Award negotiations. 
This statistic is named after the former Director of Advocacy at the New Zealand 
Employers Federation, Max Bradford, who persistently claimed in the early 1980s, that 
90 percent of settlements were within one percent of the increase applied to the Metal 
Trades Award (sec Bradford 1982; 1983, p.19). The "one percent either way" measure 
caught on (viz the OECD, Kiely etc) and it was felt appropriate to credit Bradford for 
developing this measure of dis~rsion. 
Skewness is a useful measure of the shape of the distribution of the settlements. In 
this case, a distribution is skewed if the wage settlements bunch to one side of the mean 
wage settlement extending a long tail to the other side. If the tail extends to the right the 
distribution is said to be positively skewed- indicating a considerable spread of settlement 
in excess of the mean settlement and a bunching of settlements below or very close to the 
mean settlement. The distribution of settlements is negatively skewed if the tail extends 
to the left - conversely indicating a spread of settlements lower than the mean and a 
bunching of settlements above or close to the mean wage settlement. 
In these contexts, 4 criteria are proposed to evaluate the extent of wage flexibility. 
The fust criterion is a direct comparison with PPI as a measure of inflation. Should 
wage bargaining outcomes regularly exceed inflation as measured by PPI then downwards 
flexibility will be taken to be absent. The second criterion is designed to measure the 
extent of stickiness of wage settlements within each wage round. For the reasons 
outlined earlier, it is expected that wage increases will demonstrate a certain degree of 
stickiness, particularly in the short term and within a single wage round. Although there 
are no thcoret.ical reasons to expect 90 percent of settlements to fall within one percent of 
the Metal Trades settlement, the influence of Bradford's claim upon policy debate wa;; 
sufficiently important to warrant paying particular attention to it. The criterion selected 
to measure whether this expected stickiness is flexible or inflexible is whether the 
Bradford statistic reported is less than the usually quoted figure of 90 percent. If the 
Bradford statistic in each wage round is lower than 90 percent then flexibility will be 
taken to be present. 
The third and fourth criteria are designed to measure the extent of stickiness in wage 
settlements in the medium term - in this case 5 wage rounds. It is reasonably expected 
that wage settlements over a 5 year period will have some opportunity to adjust to 
external economic factors and that some of the flexibility achieved within each wage 
round will be accumulated. If wage stickiness is to diminish over time, comparatively 
low settlements in one wage round will in successive wage rounds continue to settle at 
comparatively low figures. Conversely, a comparatively high settlement in one round 
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would be expected to be followed by comparatively high seUlements in later wage rounds. 
On the other hand, if wage stickiness is to persist over time, then low settlements in one 
round will catch-up in later rounds and that high senlements will be held-back in later 
rounds. Accordingly, the second criterion is the skewness statistic and the third 
dispersion criterion is the semi-intcrquartile range statistic. It is hypothesised that there 
will be stickiness within each wage round but that it will diminish across wage rounds. 
If this hypothesis is true then the skewness statistic will be positive and possibly quite 
large for the wage settlement data in individual wage rounds, but will be comparatively 
small (approaching zero) over the 5 wage rounds considered in this paper. A small 
skewness statistic over time would confirm the hypothesis that wage stickiness 
diminishes over time as some settlements continue to do better (or worse) than others. 
The scmi-intcrquartile range statistic could also confirm this hypothesis. If wage 
increments remained sticky over time then settlements are being 'held back' or are 
'catching-up' in successive wage rounds. In an individual wage round, the semi-
intcrquartile range statistic would then be expected to show a small and limited range 
within which settlements fell. Over time however, diminishing wage stickiness would 
be indicated by a larger semi-interquartile range statistic - being evidence of low 
settlements continuing to settle low and high settlements continuing to settle high. 
3. Wage round data 1984-1989 
Data for the 5 successive wage rounds from 1984/85 to 1988/89 are presented 
according to the type of settlement registered with the Arbitration Commission. In terms 
of the number of workers covered by the different types of senlcmcnts, awards are far and 
away the most important type of settlement Accordingly, the data is presented frrst, for 
awards only, and second, for all other registered non-award settlements (agreements, 
composite agreements and composite awards).l 
The data presented in both tables present a number of important findings. First, 
there is greater dispersion of wage increases in non-award settlements than in awards. 
This is shown by the finding, in successive wage rounds, that the standard deviations are 
smaller for awards than non-award settlements; that (with th~ exception of the 1986/87 
wage round) the semi interquartile ranges arc greater for non-award settlements than for 
awards; and that the Bradford statistic is smaller for non-award settlements than for 
awards2. Second, dispersion was greater in those wage rounds where a larger wage 
increase applied, than in those wage rounds where the wage increa~ was comparatively 
1 In the 1984/85 wage round, the percentage increment presented reflects the percentage 
change recorded by the parties in the memorandum attached to the settlement as required by 
a 1984 amendment to the Industrial Relations Act 1973. That percentage has been 
annualised as outlined earlier. The existence of these memoranda in the 1985/86 and 
1986/87 wage rounds has enabled the incorporation of data for new awards thus explaining 
the increase in "N" in the 1986/87 wage round data for award settlements. As only awards 
were required to include such a memorandum, the data presented contain only 7 more 
documents in non-award settlements than for awards. "N" for non-award settlements has 
increased in the 1986n and 1988/89 wage rounds. This is because many settlements 
registered for the first time have been successfully traced to a predecessor settlement, thus 
allowing the calculation of the annualised percentage wage change. The $8 per week 
General Wage Order of April 1984 is not included in the data. 
2 That the "Bradford statistic" is smaller in this data set than that stated by Bradford and his 
successors at the New Zealand Employers Federation can be partly attributed to the fmding 
that the Employers Federation dataset excludes settlements q.ot negotiated by Employers 
Federation advocates. This suggests that greater flexibility in settlements exists when the 
Employers Federation is not involved in the negotiating process - a hypothesis worthy of 
further investigation. 
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low. This suggests the paradox of inflation - when there is high inflation the greatest 
flexibility and opportunity for adjustment occurs. It is useful to have a variety of 
alternative measures available to judge dispersion as is shown by the data for periods of 
high inflation. In the 1985186 wage round for example, a period of comparatively high 
inflation, the dispersion as measured by the semi-interquartile range is quite small yet the 
dispersion as measured by the Bradford statistic and the standard deviation is large. In that 
particular period of high inflation there was a bunching of seulements around the mean 
wage settlement but an important number of both award and non-award settlements 
dispersed well around the mean as is shown by a Bradford statistic of 74.4 percent and the 
largest standard deviation observed of all 5 wage rounds for both award and non-award 
data 
Table 1: Variation in percentage wage increments in registered awards in successive 
wage rounds :1984185- 1988189 
1984/85 1985/86 1986/87 1987/88 1988/893 
N 260 233 274 223 206 
CPI o/o 9.4 15.5 10.6 16.1 5.6 
PPI (Inputs) o/o 8.1 15.0 3.2 8.3 4.9 
Mean increase o/o 8.5 15.8 6.9 7.5 4.0 
Standard deviation % 1.9 2.7 1.1 2.0 0.9 
Semi interquartile 
range o/o 7.7 - 8.5 15.3- 15.9 6.0- 7.4 7.0 - 8.0 3.8-4.1 
'Bradford' statistic % 84.2 74.4 89.0 69.1 89.3 
Skewness 6.3 3.0 3.7 2.9 0.5 
Note a Includes state sector documents previously issued as determinations under the 
State Services Conditions of Employment Act 1977. 
Table 2: Variation in percentage wage increments in non-award settlements in 
successive wage rounds: 1984185 -1988!89 
1984/85 1985/86 1986/87 1987/88 1988!89 
N 7 144 283 257 274 
CPI % 9.4 15.5 10.6 16.1 5.6 
PPI (Inputs) % 8.1 15.0 3.2 8.3 4.9 
Mean increase % 9.4 17.2 7.8 8.0 4.3 
Standard deviation % NA 5.3 2.8 3.7 1.4 
Semi interquartilc 
range % NA 15.4- 17.4 6.9 - 8.0 6.9 - 8.2 3.9 - 4.6 
'Bradford' statistic % NA 53.5 68.2 60.6 81.8 
Skewness NA 1.9 5.5 4.3 2.4 
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Third, the mean percentage increases for non-award settlements are greater than for 
the mean percentage increases for awards- again confmning a previously reported finding 
that awards arc settled for lower percentage wage increases than are agreements, composite 
awards and composite agreements (Harbridge, 1988; Harbridge and McCaw, 1989). 
Fourth, the distribution of both award and non-award settlements is positively skewed 
indicating considerable flexibility exists in the upper range of settlements. Fifth, mean 
wage increments are lower than inflation as measured by CPI and have not been adjusted 
to compensate for the implementation of GST. Sixth, mean wage increases were higher 
than PPI (Inputs) for the 1984/85, 1985/86 and 1986/87 wage rounds but have been 
lower in the 2 wage rounds (1987 !88 and 1988/89) negotiated Wlder the Labour Relations 
Act 1987. 
All registered settlements have been tracked through successive wage rounds to 
identify wage dispersion over time. This has been achieved by the development of a wage 
index - set at 1000 at the end of the wage freeze in December 1984. Actual non-
annualiscd increments in successive settlements have been multiplied onto this base. The 
mean percentage increases in awards and in non-award settlements, along with the standard 
deviations and the semi interquartile ranges, arc presented in Table 3. 




PPI (Inputs) o/o 
Mean wage increase % 
Standard deviation % 
















39.6 - 44.4 
3.5 
Awards have been increased on average by 40.2 percent while non-award settlements 
have increased on average by 43.8 percent. The dispersion as measured by the standard 
deviation is much greater for non-award settlements than it is for award settlements. 
Similarly, the semi interquartile range for non-award settlements is greater than for awards 
- representing about 4 percent for award settlements and nearly 5 percent for non-award 
settlements when taken over the five wage rounds since 1984. Non-award settlements are 
positively skewed indicating a small degree of upwards flexibility in those types of 
settlements. The pattern for award settlements taken over the 5 years is of interest. 
Skewness is almost zero indicating that cumulated award wage settlements are evenly 
distributed around the mean wage increase over that period. Wage increments for awards 
and non-award settlements have not kept pace with inflation as measured by CPI and 
largely this again is because the effects of GST have not been compensated for. Mean 
wage increments for awards have fallen about one percent below PPI (Inputs) over the 5 
wage rounds but mean wage increments for non-award settlements are about 2.5 percent 
ahead on the PPI for the same period. \ 
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4 .. Are wage bargaining outcomes flexible? 
Before reaching any conclusions about the extent of wage flexibility in New 
Zealand's collective bargaining system, an important caveat on those conclusions needs to 
be stressed. As noted earlier, the data understate the degree of flexibility because they 
necessarily exclude a category of settlements that bunch in the upper and lower extremes. 
The question remains - Are wage bargaining outcomes flexible? Four criteria for 
judging flexibility have been proposed - comparison with inflation as measured by PPI; 
whether the Bradford statistic is less than 90 percent; whether the semi interquartile range 
is relatively higher for the period 1984-1989 than for the separate wage rounds; and 
whether the skewness statistics are relatively lower for the period 1984-1989 than for the 
separate wage rounds. 
The comparison with inflation as measured by PPI indicates that wage costs have not 
increased at a rate faster than other costs of production. Award increases are, on average, 
approximately one percent lower than PPI over the 5 years 1984-1989 while non-award 
increases are on average, about 2.5 percent higher than PPI. This indicates that award and 
non-award settlements are not inflexible, in that they are settled for increases that reflect 
other production costs. 
There is important evidence of flexibility in wage settlements within each wage 
round using the criteria chosen. This flexibility is greater than that generally expected 
and is important in itself. The flexibility is demonstrated by the finding that the Bradford 
statistic is always smaller than the 90 percent claimed by Bradford himself. There are 2 
wage rounds, 1986/87 and 1988/89, when the Bradford statistic is very close to 90 percent 
for awards alone. However the Bradford statistic is always much lower than 90 percent for 
non-award settlements and in 3 wage rounds the Bradford statistic is much lower than 90 
percent for awards. 
There is also important evidence of flexibility in wage settlements when examined 
over the period 1984-1989. The flexibility observed within a single wage round can be 
shown to increase over time. The criterion proposed for measuring flexibility over time 
was an examination of the semi interquartile range and skewness statistics. Diminishing 
wage stickiness would be shown by a comparatively low skewness statistic over time and 
a comparatively high semi interquartile range statistic . Within any individual wage 
round, the semi interquartile range is never greater than 1.4 percent for award settlements 
and 2.0 percent for non-award settlements. Over the period 1984-1989 the semi 
interquartile range is 3.9 percent for awards and 4.8 percent for non-awards. The semi 
intcrquartile range is then large in the medium term supporting the hypothesis that wage 
stickiness is diminishing over time. The skewness statistic for award settlements is 
lower over the period 1984-1989 than the skewness for award settlements in any 
individual wage round, again supporting the hypothesis that wage stickiness is 
diminishing over time. The skewness statistic is positive and not so small for non-award 
settlements over the period 1984-1989. This indicates that non-award seulcmcnts that 
have settled high in one wage round have continued to settle at high levels in subsequent 
wage rounds, but that low settlements have tended to catch up. The overall conclusion 
that must be reached from examining the skewness and semi interquartile range statistics 
is that wage stickiness is diminishing in the medium term and that an important degree of 
wage flexibility can be demonstrated over the period of the five wage rounds examined. 
Despite the folklore to the contrary, the data presented in this paper indicate that, 
compared with measures of inflation, and within and between wage rounds, a very 
important degree of wage flexibility exists as an output of collective wage bargaining in 
New Zealand. 
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